darth
Sergeant
Posts: 256
|
Post by darth on Jan 14, 2015 10:18:39 GMT -5
|
|
joey
Private
Atlantis Airsoft
Posts: 43 
|
Post by joey on Jan 21, 2015 18:48:18 GMT -5
Are there teams based off of color gear in this event? If so what is tan?
|
|
|
|
Post by waterboy on Jan 21, 2015 20:01:27 GMT -5
I would also like to know tre rIke's or where to find them.
|
|
darth
Sergeant
Posts: 256
|
Post by darth on Jan 22, 2015 7:55:59 GMT -5
Are there teams based off of color gear in this event? If so what is tan? Yes based on color. I have asked who is going to be which. Still waitin for answer. I would also like to know tre rIke's or where to find them. ? |
|
|
|
Post by waterboy on Jan 22, 2015 9:29:44 GMT -5
I apologize, my phone does not like the forums. What I meant to say was I would also like to know the rules.
|
|
darth
Sergeant
Posts: 256
|
Post by darth on Jan 22, 2015 12:35:49 GMT -5
|
|
darth
Sergeant
Posts: 256
|
Post by darth on Jan 24, 2015 9:17:08 GMT -5
The Breaking Point
Although the evolution of America's Bosnia policy, including the predicament of the Clinton administration in the summer of 1995, is relatively well known, the details of the administration's policy-making process during this period are not. Based on new extensive research, including numerous interviews with key participants, it is now possible to begin filling in some of the critical details on how the administration arrived at its decision in August 1995. Though few realized it at the beginning of the year, 1995 would prove to be the decisive year for Bosnia's future. That shift stemmed from a decision, reached by the Bosnian Serb leadership in early March, that the fourth year of the war would be its last. The Bosnian Serb objective was clear: to conclude the war before the onset of the next winter. The strategy was simple, even if its execution was brazen. First, a large-scale attack on the three eastern Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde—each an international 'safe' area lightly protected by a token U.N. presence—would swiftly capture these Muslim outposts in Serb-controlled Bosnian territory. Next, attention would shift to Bihac—a fourth, isolated enclave in north-western Bosnia—which would be taken over with assistance from Croatian Serb forces. Finally, with the Muslims on the run, Sarajevo would become the grand prize, and its capture by the fall would effectively conclude the war.
Betrayal in Srebrenica
As the Bosnian Serb strategy unfolded through the spring and into summer, the 20,000-strong U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia confronted a fateful dilemma. UNPROFOR could actively oppose the Bosnian Serb effort and side with the Muslim victims of the war. But this would entail sacrificing the evenhandedness that is the hallmark of U.N. peacekeeping. Alternatively, UNPROFOR could preserve its much-vaunted neutrality and limit its role to protecting humanitarian relief supplies and agencies. But this would effectively leave the Muslims to face the Bosnian Serb assault virtually unprotected.
Washington's preference was clear. It repeatedly demanded that the U.N. forces either stop the latest Bosnian Serb assault or, at the very least, agree to NATO air strikes to punish the Serb forces and protect the "safe" areas. Most European allies had a different view. Unlike the United States, many Europeans had placed their troops at risks by participating in the U.N. operation on the understanding that their involvement would be limited to a strictly humanitarian mandate. When limited air strikes in late May 1995 resulted in nearly 400 peacekeepers being taken hostage, a consensus quickly emerged within the U.N. and among the troop-contributing countries that, however limited, NATO air strikes would do more harm than good. The United Nations force would return to "traditional peacekeeping principles". This sent the not-so-subtle message to the Bosnian Serbs that they were now free to pursue their preferred strategy. That strategy, called "ethnic cleansing," involved using murder, rape, expulsion and imprisonment on a large scale to drive Muslims and Croats from territory the Bosnian Serbs wished to claim.
The Bosnian Serbs implemented their strategy with horrifying results. In July, Serb forces turned their focus to Srebrenica, a small village near the eastern border with Serbia swollen with some 60,000 Muslim refugees. It was there that the then-U.N. commander, French General Philippe Morillon, had two years earlier made the U.N.'s final stance, declaring at the time: "You are now under U.N. protection of the United Nations.... I will never abandon you." Despite the U.N. flag flying over the enclave, the Bosnian Serb assault in July 1995 met no U.N. resistance either on the ground or from the air. Within 10 days, tens of thousands of Muslim refugees streamed into the Muslim-controlled city of Tuzla. Missing from the stream of refugees were more than 7,000 men of all ages, who had been executed in cold blood - mass murder on a scale not witnessed in Europe since the end of World War II.
"No More Pinpricks"Srebrenica was the West's greatest shame, with each of the 7,079 lives lost underscoring the failure to act in time to avert this single most genocidal act of the Bosnian war. Guilt led senior representatives of the United States and its key allies to agree in London a few days later that NATO would make a strong stand at Gorazde by defending the town's civilian population. (This decision was later extended to the three other remaining 'safe' areas of Bihac, Sarajevo, and Tuzla; Zepa had earlier fallen to the Bosnian Serbs). The allies agreed that an attack on, or even a threat to, Gorazde would be met with a "substantial and decisive" air campaign. "There'll be no more "pinprick" strikes," Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared. A few days later, the North Atlantic Council worked out the final operational details of the air campaign and passed the decision to NATO's military commanders on when to conduct the strikes.
Breaking Out of the Box
By the end of July the United States and its allies confronted a situation that required concerted action. The strategy of muddling through that had characterized U.S. policy since the beginning of the conflict clearly was no longer viable. The president made clear to his senior advisers that he wanted to get out of the box in which U.S. policy found itself. This box had been created by an unworkable diplomatic strategy of offering ever greater concessions to Serb President Slobodan Milosevic just to get the Bosnian Serbs to the table; by the long-standing refusal to put U.S. troops on the ground; by allied resistance to using force as long as their troops could be taken hostage; by a U.N. command that insisted on "traditional peacekeeping principles" even though a war was raging; and by a U.S. Congress bent on taking the moral high ground by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government without, however, taking responsibility for the consequences of doing so.
Yet, the Clinton administration had been here before. In early 1993 it rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; in May 1993 it tried to sell a policy to lift the arms embargo and conduct air strikes while the Muslims were being armed; and in 1994 it had sought repeatedly to convince the allies to support strategic air strikes. Each time, the new policy was rejected or shelved, and an incremental, crisis management approach was once again substituted for a viable approach to end the war.
Why was the summer of 1995 any different? Why the emergence of a firm consensus on a concerted strategy now when it had eluded the Clinton administration for over two years? The answer, in part, lies in the horrors witnessed by Srebrenica—a sense that this time the Bosnian Serbs had gone too far. That certainly proved to be the case in the Pentagon, where Defense Secretary William Perry and JCS Chairman John Shalikashvili took the lead in pushing for the kind of vigorous air campaign that was finally agreed to in London. The real reason, however, was the palpable sense that Bosnia was the cancer eating away at American foreign policy, in the words of Anthony Lake, Clinton's national security adviser. U.S. credibility abroad was being undermined perceptibly by what was happening in Bosnia, and by the America's and NATO's failure to end it. With presidential elections a little over a year away, the White House in particular felt the need to find a way out.
It was a way out that the president demanded from his foreign policy team in June 1995. Spearheaded by the National Security Council staff and strongly supported by Madeleine Albright (then the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations), America's first coherent Bosnia strategy was developed. This strategy for the first time matched force and diplomacy in a way that would break the policy impasse that had strangled Washington for so long. It was debate by the president and his senior advisers over the course of three days in August and, when accepted by Clinton, became the basis for the diplomatic triumph in Dayton three months later.
This will be a force on force Scenario based on the Bosnian War. Uniforms will be as follows, Bosnian Serbs- Tan, Dessert Digital, insurgent(civilian), Chocolate Chip, Black, Mixed Cammo, NATO- ODGreen, ACU, Woodland, Tiger, Marpat, Multi Cam.
|
|
darth
Sergeant
Posts: 256
|
Post by darth on Feb 26, 2015 16:16:26 GMT -5
All rules for this event have been posted on the Facebook page.
That being said as of now I am out for this one. Rules changed and my gun is out side limits.
|
|
darth
Sergeant
Posts: 256
|
Post by darth on May 11, 2015 6:43:58 GMT -5
This event is this weekend guys. Excellent chance to play at a awesome facility. Also a few of the Valken Prostaff will be there. So you can meet some Airsoft celebraties.
|
|
|
|
Post by Raptor on May 11, 2015 20:46:13 GMT -5
This event is this weekend guys. Excellent chance to play at a awesome facility. Also a few of the Valken Prostaff will be there. So you can meet some Airsoft celebraties. Or how about naw unless im gunna get the same treatment that Kilroy from team Mako got at Copperhead from a Prostaff member. Also airsoft "Celebraties" dont exist, those are called tryhards ;D. |
|
darth
Sergeant
Posts: 256
|
Post by darth on May 14, 2015 7:39:19 GMT -5
This event is this weekend guys. Excellent chance to play at a awesome facility. Also a few of the Valken Prostaff will be there. So you can meet some Airsoft celebraties. Or how about naw unless im gunna get the same treatment that Kilroy from team Mako got at Copperhead from a Prostaff member. Also airsoft "Celebraties" dont exist, those are called tryhards ;D. I guess I missed what happened with Kilroy. But either way. This is a great AO. And around 400 players. So it is still going to be a good time. |
|
